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Abstract
We explore the implications of European integration for ﬁscal decentralization in EU member states with
a dataset on 21 OECD countries over the 1975-2000 period. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology is
used to establish causality. EU member states are classiﬁed as the treatment and non-EU OECD countries
as the control group. The Maastricht treaty is interpreted as a quasi-experimental policy intervention that
substantially advanced European integration. Our results suggest that tax decentralization has increased
in EU countries after the signing of the Maastricht treaty. The treaty’s eﬀect on expenditure decentral-
ization also seems to be positive, but is less clear-cut.
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1 Introduction
It is evident that the deepening economic and political integration in the European Union (EU) has been
accompanied by a successive reduction of national control over various policy areas. The introduction of the
common currency and the simultaneous renunciation of control over monetary policy to the supranational
European Central Bank (ECB) by member states is only one, but perhaps the most obvious, indication
of these realignments in political power.1
While a large literature analyzes the consequences of European integration for the relationship between
European institutions and national governments2, its implications for the internal organization of member
states are less well explored. In most countries, both constitutional and/or central government stipulations
determine a particular allocation of authority between the tiers of government. The emergence of a new
tier at the European level disturbs this equilibrium. It is, therefore, of interest to ask how member states
will react to this disturbance. Will central governments be able to compensate for the loss of authority
to supranational institutions by expanding their powers at the cost of subnational governments? Or will
economic and political integration coincide with an increase in subnational autonomy?
In this paper, we analyze the implications of European integration for the extent of subnational auton-
omy in EU member states. Our empirical strategy focuses on the Treaty on European Union (henceforth
Maastricht treaty) which was signed by the twelve member states of the European Community (EC)
in 1991. We interpret the Maastricht treaty as a quasi-experimental policy intervention that substan-
tially advanced economic and political integration in the EU, and explore with the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
methodology whether this progression towards an uniﬁed European polity has had an eﬀect on the extent
of ﬁscal decentralization in member states.
Our results indicate that the treaty has led to an expansion of tax decentralization in EU countries.
The results with regard to expenditure decentralization are less straightforward, but seem to suggest that
this aspect of subnational autonomy has also increased after the signing of the treaty.
This paper contributes to the discussion on the implications of economic integration for the scope and
structure of the public sector. It is also related to the literature on the determinants of (de-) centralization.
Furthermore, even though it is concerned with developments in the EU, its ﬁndings might be of interest
to countries in other parts of the world that are attempting to coordinate their policies at a supranational
level.3
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The theoretical arguments that link economic
integration with (ﬁscal) decentralization, and the existing empirical evidence are surveyed in section 2.
We describe our methodology and the data in section 3. The results are collected in section 4. Finally,
we conclude in section 5.
2 Economic integration and ﬁscal decentralization: Theoretical arguments
and empirical evidence
Several contributions suggest that globalization– a term that is used in this literature interchangeably
with economic integration– increases the number of countries. Alesina and Spolaore (1997), for example,
develop a Hotelling-type model where the optimal size of a country is determined, at given levels of
international trade, by two countervailing eﬀects: On the one hand, the size of the market and thus the
ability to exploit scale economies increases in country size; on the other hand, citizens experience greater
“preference costs” in larger countries because public goods are “farther away”. Within this framework,
1 See Schmidt (1999) for a comprehensive account of these developments.
2 See, among others, Persson and Tabellini (1996), Persson and Tabellini (1997), and Alesina and Wacziarg
(1999).
3 Examples for similar but far less ambitious projects are NAFTA and ASEAN.
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economic integration reduces the relative beneﬁts of a large country size by allowing access to foreign
markets.4
Even though these contributions are concerned with the breakup of nations, it is true that secessions
are radical and often costly measures. A less costly way to achieve regional self-rule is through decentral-
ization. By implementing an appropriate degree of decentralization, the economic beneﬁts of separation
can generally be obtained without the need to incur the costs of achieving and maintaining independence
(Bolton and Roland, 1997). Alesina and Spolaore (2003) therefore expand their previous contributions
accordingly and consider decentralization as an alternative to outright independence.
For EU countries, decentralization of political and ﬁscal authority is clearly more relevant than the
political independence of regions. Even though demands for regional autonomy have increased in several
EU countries5 (Newhouse, 1997), there has been since World War II not a single instance of secession.
Therefore, if the underlying argument of the literature on the size of nations is true, we should observe
for EU countries that economic integration leads to more decentralization rather than to the proliferation
of new countries.
Another argument for why globalization could be positively associated with decentralization is that
citizens might want to balance the loss of control to “global” forces which necessarily follows an increase in
international trade with an expansion of local autonomy. This argument suggests that central governments
will successively loose power to both supra- and subnational institutions as economic integration proceeds,
leaving them eventually only with a rudimentary set of responsibilities (World Bank, 2000).
It is not certain, however, that globalization necessarily leads to more decentralization. There are a
number of countervailing eﬀects which suggest the opposite relationship. Cameron (1978) and Rodrik
(1998), for example, argue that more integrated economies are more susceptible to economic shocks, and
thus require more stabilization policies and interregional redistribution, both of which tend to be conducted
at the national level.
Furthermore, instead of diminishing the role of central governments, the ability of individual regions
to survive as independent entities when the economy is globalized might actually lead to an expansion of
central authority. If the majority of the population of a country values its territorial integrity highly and
perceives regional autonomy as a precursor for secession, it might respond to the “threat” of secession by
giving the central government additional powers (Garrett and Rodden, 2003). The central government
might then intervene in diﬀerent ways. On the one hand, it could increase the cost of secession by
enhancing its coercive potential through an expansion of the military apparatus. On the other hand,
it could improve the incentives for remaining in the uniﬁed nation by increasing interregional transfers
to those regions that can credibly threaten to secede (Treisman, 1999). If it is diﬃcult for the central
government to credibly commit to these transfers, it could also allocate political power to institutions
through which it can force its own hand. The central government could, for example, introduce a strong
second chamber with regional representation or expand the number of legislative areas in which qualiﬁed
majorities are required to pass legislation (Kyriacou, 2009).
Why are we so prominently discussing the implications of globalization in a study that is supposedly
concerned with the consequences of European integration? The reason is that globalization and European
integration, even though they are in principle distinct phenomena, share many similarities. Within the
EU, formal trade barriers have been abolished, informal barriers have been reduced, and there are no
restrictions for capital and labor mobility. These developments combined with the fact that EU countries
predominantly trade with each other imply that the common market in Europe constitutes a form of
4 See Bolton et al. (1996) and Ruta (2005) for a survey of this literature. Ruta (2005) also discusses economic
integration within the context of the EU.
5 Examples include the Basque Region and Catalonia in Spain, Wales and Scotland in Great Britain, and Flanders
and Wallonia in Belgium .
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advanced globalization. Thus, European integration should aﬀect EU member states in the same way as
globalization does, making the literature on the consequences of globalization for the shape and structure
of countries relevant for this study.
Apart from the literature on globalization in general, there are also some contributions that speciﬁcally
address the implications of European integration for intergovernmental relations within member states.
These contributions generally echo the ﬁndings of the literature on globalization. For example, a popular
interpretation of the deepening supranational integration is that a new federal state is evolving in Europe
(Bednar et al., 1996). John (1996) describes several alternative scenarios for how European statehood
might inﬂuence the relationship between central and subnational governments within individual member
states.6 These scenarios can be summarized as follows: (i) European level institutions and local gov-
ernments expand their power at the cost of the central government. As a consequence, an “Europe of
Regions” emerges.7 (ii) Central governments expand their power at the cost of subnational governments
by arguing that they require more authority to inﬂuence decisions at the European level. This scenario
implies an increase in centralization. (iii) European institutions expand their power equally at the cost of
both central and subnational governments. Therefore, there is no change in the extent of decentralization
within member states.
Overall, it is unclear from a theoretical perspective whether globalization in general and European
integration in particular will lead to more or less decentralization. This question has therefore to be
answered empirically. The existing contributions, however, are ambiguous. With regard to the link
between globalization and the size of nations, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) and Alesina et al. (2000)
ﬁnd that there is a positive correlation between openness to trade and the size of a country. While
this result is not directly related to the discussion on decentralization, it supports the hypothesis that
increased economic integration makes it feasible for citizens to organize themselves in smaller political
entities. Garrett and Rodden (2003), on the other hand, reach the opposite conclusion. They ﬁnd that
economic integration is correlated with increases in ﬁscal centralization. Finally, the study by Stegarescu
(2004), which is probably the one most closely related to this paper, investigates both the consequences
of globalization in general and European integration in particular. He ﬁnds relatively weak evidence
that globalization has increased ﬁscal decentralization in OECD countries, but no evidence indicating a
relationship between European integration and ﬁscal decentralization.
3 Methodology and data
While we have discussed in the previous section the implications of economic integration on decentral-
ization in general, we will only consider its impact on ﬁscal decentralization in the empirical part of this
paper. We discuss in subsection 3.1 this particular variant of decentralization. Our methodological ap-
proach is explained and motivated in subsections 3.2 and 3.3. Finally, the dataset used in the regressions
is described in subsection 3.4.
3.1 Types of decentralization
The general concept of decentralization has diﬀerent dimensions, all of which try to capture the extent
of subnational autonomy. A useful classiﬁcation is provided by Treisman (2002). For example, one
aspect of the relationship between central and subnational governments that is related to the level of
political decentralization is whether local decision makers are appointed by the central government or
6 John (1996) considers six diﬀerent scenarios. However, not all of the are relevant for the discussion of the
implications of European integration on decentralization.
7 See Dre`ze (1993) for further elaboration on this point, and also the literature on “glocalization”, for example
Sharma (2005).
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elected by their constituency. Another variant is known as ﬁscal decentralization and pertains to the ﬁscal
autonomy of subnational governments: the extent of subnational control over tax instruments and public
expenditures.
The empirical literature on decentralization is primarily concerned with ﬁscal decentralization. This
has several reasons. First, the results from the theory on ﬁscal federalism are especially applicable to
this aspect of subnational autonomy. Second, ﬁscal decentralization is a particularly accurate indicator
of subnational autonomy because the ability to fund projects and collect revenues at ones own discretion
lies at the heart of political authority. Third, ﬁscal decentralization can be measured more subtly than
other types of decentralization, which often can only be captured by dummy variables.
It should be noted at the outset that a ﬁscally decentralized state is not the same as a federation.
The deﬁning characteristic of a federation is that the competencies of the federal and subnational tiers of
government are demarcated by the constitution and not subject to the discretion of the central government,
or, at most, only in a limited manner. Subnational governments in federations, however, do not necessarily
have more ﬁscal autonomy than in unitary states. For example, subnational governments in France, which
is a unitary state, have signiﬁcantly more tax autonomy than those in Germany, which is a federation
(Stegarescu, 2005).
We follow the literature and use the extent of ﬁscal decentralization as a proxy for subnational autonomy.
Fiscal decentralization is traditionally measured by the IMF’s GFS data, and is calculated as the share of
subnational expenditures in total government expenditures (expenditure decentralization) or as the share of
subnational revenues in total government revenues (revenue decentralization). These IMF measures have
been widely criticized on the grounds that they fail to capture the “real” extent of decentralization. The
problem is that these measures do not indicate whether subnational governments have the authority to
decide independently on taxes and spending, or whether they simply collect revenues and spend according
to central government regulations. Therefore, they might give a very misleading picture of the real extent
of subnational ﬁscal autonomy (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002).
OECD (1999) provides an alternative measure of ﬁscal decentralization for several OECD countries.
This measure is superior to the IMF’s GFS measures because it tries to capture the extent of independent
subnational decision making power. It is constructed as the the ratio of subnational tax revenues from
taxes for which rates and/or bases are determined by subnational governments, and general government
tax revenues. This measure of ﬁscal decentralization therefore captures the extent of tax decentralization.
While using the same classiﬁcation as OECD (1999), Stegarescu (2005) extends the cross-section data of
the OECD into a panel dataset.8 Since variation over the time dimension is necessary for the methodology
proposed in this paper, we use his database in the regressions.
Unfortunately, a similar measure for the expenditure side of the budget is, to our knowledge, not
available. We therefore measure expenditure decentralization with a variable that is supplied in a World
Bank database. This database is, in turn, based on the IMF’s GFS data.
In ﬁgure 1, we depict the evolution of tax decentralization in several countries from 1975-2000. For
some countries, data is only available up to 1999 (notably Australia and Belgium). As can be seen, there
is signiﬁcant cross-country variation, e. g. tax decentralization in Switzerland is about ﬁfteen times as
high as in Austria (see also table 6 in the appendix). There is also some amount of within-variation. For
example, tax decentralization in Belgium, Spain and Italy has started to increase around the beginning of
the nineties.
The evolution of the expenditure decentralization variable in the same set of countries is depicted in
ﬁgure 2. Data is only available up to 1998 for some countries. While a similar amount of cross-country
8 Actually, three diﬀerent measures are provided. But only one of these captures subnational autonomy in its
“pure” form and is therefore used in this study. The other two measures take subnational revenue from shared
taxes and intergovernmental transfers into account.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the nexus between European integration and subnational ﬁscal auton-
omy. Two aspects of subnational ﬁscal autonomy were considered: tax and expenditure decentralization.
Whereas our results indicate that the Maastricht treaty has caused a signiﬁcant increase in tax decen-
tralization, the results with regard to expenditure decentralization are less striking. While the baseline
regressions suggest that the treaty has had no eﬀect on expenditure decentralization, additional estima-
tions provide some, albeit weak, evidence that expenditure decentralization has increased in the aftermath
of the treaty’s adoption. In view of these results, we conclude that European integration has led to an
expansion of ﬁscal decentralization in member states. If this ﬁnding is any indication for the future, it
suggests that the EU is indeed headed towards an “Europe of Regions”.
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